§ 5. Islamic political thought

§ 5.  Islamic political thought

The Koran does not contain a theory of politics. Like other scriptures, it is a text for all occasions, to be referred to, deferred to, and quoted, all in a ceaseless interpretative enterprise. What the Koran does contain are general maxims and injunctions to which specific meaning has been imputed by generations of Muslim authors. The three broad genres of political theorizing in Islam - the religious and juristic, the philosophical, and that expressed in Mirrors-for-Princes - have all drawn on the Koran in support of the severe hierarchical (though not inclement) authoritarianism which they share.

The religious and juristic genre is available in two versions, corresponding to the major denominational division of Islam into Sunnite id Shiite; Sunnites hold that political and religious authority should be vested in the person of an imam-caliph belonging to the tribe of Quraish, to which Muhammad belonged, while Shiites limit legitimacy to the line of Muhammad's cousin Ali with differences regarding the narrower definition of the incum­bent. And while the Shiites hold that their position is justified by the specific designation by Muhammad of Ali as his successor, and consequently regard the imamate in the line of Ali as an article of dogma, Sunnites have generally based their position on traditional consensus - consensus being a major source for legislation. Scholars of both denominations have occasionally employed another argument for the necessity of having an imam, that political authority in general is rendered necessary by the innate inadequacy of individual men, who therefore convene to appoint an authority capable of imposing order and justice on the community thus formed.

As Sunnism was the party of order and government, it relegated the issue of the perfect caliphate to the realm of utopia; only the first four caliphs, the last of whom was Ali (d. 661), conformed to the ideal in varying degrees. True caliphate had become sullied with kingship (mulk), but the eschatological corollaries of this implicit assumption, which provided much sustenance to the Shiites, were subdued and removed from the political to the devotional sphere of life. The early history and prehistory of Sunnism, and of the theory of the caliphate, still awaits detailed research, but from the days of the great traditionalist and unambiguous Sunni, Ahmad Ibn Hanbal (d. 851), the Sunni conception of the caliphate became concrete legislation rather than speculative theory. Ibn Hanbal himself conceded that the caliphal office need not necessarily be held by 'the most excellent' (al-afdal), but could legitimately be discharged by 'the less excellent' (al-mafdul).

The most systematic exposition of the Sunni theory of the caliphate is that of Mawardi (d. 1058). The caliphate, according to the tradition he represented and formalized as statutes of public law, is incumbent upon the community and falls under mu 'amalat. Islamic law divides rights into those of God (ibadat, devotions), and those of man (private and public law, mu'amalat). The caliphate is instituted as a vice-regency of the Prophet Muhammad, and its incumbent is the guardian of religion as well as pastor of worldly affairs. A caliph designated by the community represented by an elite (ahl al-hall wal-'aqd). He was called a ruling caliph. In a later development, Ghazali (d. 1111) introduced the idea that a caliph might legitimately be designated by an overpowering temporal, usually military, authority, whereby caliphal and sultanic authorities may co-operate in the maintenance of order and the upholding of Islamic law. This same idea of a temporal-spiritual co-operation implying the stripping of the caliphate of its political and military functions had been foreshadowed by Mawardi, who decreed admissible the usurpation by a powerful martial authority of the political prerogatives of the caliphate, provided the sultan protected the caliphate, applied Islamic law, and extracted canonical taxes.

In this context of reduced temporal competence, the caliphal incumbent had to conform to a number of conditions, including moral probity as required by legal witnesses, Quraishite descent, and learning as required by a judgeship. Though Ghazali relaxed some of these requirements, and though some jurists admitted the legitimacy of the coexistence of more than one caliph, the canonical theory was never shelved, but kept in abeyance. The essential conception of state institutions such as the Vizirate, the Mint, military command, and the legal and devotional hierarchies as exten­sions of the caliphal office was never revised.

There were, however, alternative theories arising from the temporal powerlessness of the caliphs. Ibn Jama'a (d. 1333) regarded any authority as legitimate and transferred to sultanic authority the provisions of consti­tutional theories worked out in the Sunni legal tradition. His more radical contemporary Ibn Taimiyya (d. 1328) characteristically confron­ted mundane imperfection in a direct manner, and denied the mandatory character of the caliphate outright. The presence of a caliph is not, as in classical theory, an obligation incum­bent upon the community of Muslims. The heirs of the Prophet are the class of 'ulama, religious and legal scholars, he maintained, in line with many members of this learned class. State and religion are indissolubly linked, for without the state religious authority and duties cannot be properly maintained, and without religion the state will become sheer tyranny. Ibn Taimiyya then put forward legal statues for the proper order of life in accordance with the shara'a, Islamic law, which the sovereign was to enforce and guard.

The question of order lies at the root of all these theories and variations on theories. The good order of the world requires absolutist authority, and obedience is owed to the caliph as it is owed to the sovereign. Insurrection against a ruler, no matter how tyrannical or impious he might be, was ruled out in the mainstream of Sunni theory. The caliphate cannot be impeached, though it might be forfeited by insanity or captivity; the institution of a new caliphal order is meant to accomplish the same providential purpose of keeping the good order of the world, assuring the exercise of religion, and thus preparing for the good order of the world to come. The Shiites provided the most consistent theories of the public order most conducive to the fulfillment of divine purpose. In an imperfect world not complicated by political involvement such as that incumbent upon Sunni legists, the Shiite conception of the imamate assured the maintenance of absolute religious purpose as well as of order by the community in this world. With the caliphate definitively usurped and transformed into mulch in 680 with the death in the battlefield of Hussein, the son of Ali and the third imam, divine purpose is assured in the world by obedience to the impeccable imams in the charismatic line. The Sunnite conception! traditional legitimacy embodied in consensus is rejected in favour of the belief in the divine designation of legitimate authority. The imam is not only impeccable, but also infallible by virtue of an esoteric omniscience transmitted from imam to imam and originally conveyed to the world by God; the difference between an imam and a prophet is that the former does not transmit to the world a divine scripture, as Muhammad did the Koran.

To this impeccable authoritarianism it wedded the belief that the good order of world could not be maintained if in any age l imam were absent. When the twelfth imam disappeared in a cave in 873, it was held that his absence had inaugurated the Occultation, and that he would return as the Mahdi (Messiah) to fill the iniquitous world with justice and rectitude, and to inaugurate a period, which prepares for the apocalypse. Thus the coming of the Mahdi closes the cycle of history and returns things to the original Adamic order.

Rather more elaborate is the cyclical theory of the Ismailis, so-called because they vested the legitimate imamate in Muhammad, the second son of Isma'il Ibn Ja'far and the seventh in the line of Ali by their reckoning. Like the Twelvers (so called because of their belief in the return of the twelfth descendant of Ali), the Ismailis too believed in the return of their own Mahdi, albeit within a more elaborate conception of history as consisting of seven great cycles of prophecy and iniquity, the penultimate having been inaugurated by the Prophet Muhammad and the last to be signaled by the return of Muhammad Ibn Isma'il. This doctrine was subjected to a variety of adjustment necessitated by the worldly complications connected with the foundation and prosperity of the Ismailis' own mighty state, the Fatimid caliphate (909-1171). Among other things the Druze faith arose from the belief that the Fatimid caliph al-Hakim, who disappeared in 1021, was God incarnate. It is doubtless proto-Ismaili undercurrents which led to the rise of many a messianic Sunnite political movement, especially in North Africa and Spain, based on belief in the semi-divine character of mystical thaumaturgues and wonder-workers and in the cyclical conception of history involving the transformation of caliphate into kingship. One such movement led to the short-lived state in the Algarve under the mystical saint Ibn Qasi (d. 1151).

Allied to both the mystical and the Ismaili conceptions of the imamate was a very elaborate cosmology and cosmogony, in which analogies and correspondences were established between cosmic and mundane principles. Philosopher Farabi (i.950) drew less literal analogies between the cosmic and political orders. In line with the new-Platonic Aristotelianism prevalent in Islamic philosophy, Farabi saw creation as a process of emanation along a descending hierarchy. In the same way, the good order of the world depends on placing everything in its proper station. Only thus will the mundane microcosm correspond to the heavenly macrocosm. The world contains a variety of imperfect cities described as oligarchies and other systems. The 'virtuous city' (al-madina al-fadila) is one in which a sovereign kept good order in full possession of ethical, rational, and practical virtues. On to this Platonic conception Farabi attempted to graft Islamic conceptions of prophethood and the imamate. He sometimes called his philosopher-king 'imam', and attributed to him some of the qualifications normally attaching to the caliph. Farabi accepts the requirement of Islam that the prophet be a lawgiver, but philosophizes this by assuming the soul of the prophet to be united with Active Intellect. But there is no true attempt at synthesizing Islamic dogma and metaphysics in the work of Farabi.

In contrast to this bookish utopia, the great new-Platonic Aristotelian Ibn Sina (Avicenna-d.1037) deduced the necessity of human association along the familiar conventional lines, and then unambiguously affirmed the centrality of shari'a for the good order of the world. He made no attempt to equate the philosopher with the prophet, but elevated the cosmic rungs higher than the former. The prophet, according to Ibn Sina, has an intuitive and immediate perception of intelligible, much like that obtaining in mystical gnosis. It is the prophet, not the philosopher, who is the lawgiver, and authority in this world belongs to an imam defined in terms not dissimilar to those already encountered in the classical theory of the caliphate. Philosophy therefore has no immediate bearing upon the world, but seems to be a form of participation in the world of intelligible, intellectual and Gnostic, which is the preserve of the few.

The most pronounced development of this conception came with Ibn Rushd (Averroes - d. 1198). For him, philosophy is a mode of apprehending this world and the heavenly world of which few persons are capable. Dialectical and sophistical modes of appre­hension are fitting for the mass of humanity. The letter of dogma, suitable for the mass, is not in itself false, but has an additional, parallel sense to which philosophy provides access. But philosophy does not abrogate dogma, for 'truth does not contradict truth'. Philosophy therefore has no direct bearing on public law; the caliphal order guaranteeing the rule of shari'a is the best form of government. And in this connection Ibn Rushd actively worked on the refinement of shari'a in the context of the theory of maqasid al-shari'a, of legal 'purpose', a conception akin to that of natural law.

The same practical purpose is clearly behind the Mirrors-for-Princes. Such books are con­ceived as instruments of rule, from the work of the state secretary Ibn al-Muqaffa' (d. 759), through that attributed to the theologian and litterateur Jahiz (d. 868), on to the book by the celebrated Vizier Nizam al-Mulk (d. 1092), a treatise by the jurist Turtushi (d. 1126), the book by Abu Hammu (d. 1386), king of Tiemcen, and many others. Kingship is usually seen as falling into three categories: that based on religion, clearly the best and the most conducive to salvation, that based on reason and assuring the good order of the world, and that of passion and caprice, the sure road to perdition in this world and the next. As instruments of rule, Mirrors-for-Princes contain ethical and practical maxims, sentences, and a wealth of historical examples of rule, good and bad, which are meant to warn and serve as models. They contain no explicit theory of politics except in so far as they affirm the primacy of the sovereign, almost his transcendence, in relation to his subjects, who are a formless mass rather than a body politic, and whose cohesion is assured only by hierarchy. The sovereign is the shadow of God on earth, and relates to his subjects as God relates to His creation, much as in Farabi's city.

Mirrors-for-Princes thus consist of collec­tions of topics germane to the maintenance of a hierarchical order in which religion is protected by the state and acts, for some, as the foundation of its ethos. The ethical idea that is perhaps most privileged is justice. Justice is the maintenance of things in their proper stations and the regulation of practical life in accordance with the requirements of stability. Abu Hammu expressed this well in his statement that there can be 'no power without an army, no army without money, no money without taxation, no taxation without prosperity, no prosperity without justice'. Justice thus assures the main­tenance of both religious and rational gov­ernment. Caprice fosters injustice.

Ibn Khaldun elevated the same historical presentation and analo­gical use to the status of a systematic science. Ibn Khaldun was heir to all three Islamic traditions, which are fused in his work, but he had few followers, and he was understood by posterity as a particularly acute contributor to the tradition of Mirrors-for-Princes. Ottoman 'Khaldunism' was of this variety.

Modem Islamic political thought is differen­tly cast from the tendencies described above, although the juristic and eschatological cur­rents are still present. Perhaps the first signifi­cant modem Islamic reformer was Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab (d. 1792), whose doctrine is official dogma in Saudi Arabia. He sought to revivify the political and social doctrines of Ibn Taimiyya, and combined with the head of the House of Saud to set up a regime sustained by the shari'a and legitimized by it. But sovereignty (hakimiyya) is the preserve of God.

Wahhabism, though attractive to some, had little relevance to more complex societies.

Islamic political thought in the nineteenth century is associated with the names of Jamal al-Din Asadabadi (alias Afghani - d. 1897) and his pupil Muhammad Abdu (d. 1905). The efforts of the former were concentrated on an attempt to unify all Muslim powers in order to counter colonial encroachment, while Abdu agitated along with him and finally settled in the position of Grand Mufti of Egypt where he worked on reforming the shari'a. Both believed that the Muslims were weak because they had abandoned authentic Islam and allowed non-Islamic superstitions and thoughts to corrupt it. The answer to this situation was a return to fundamentals (Asadabadi was a keen admirer of Luther); like all fundamentalism, this one sought to obliterate what was generally accepted as Islam in order to introduce moder­nist ideas which could be sustained by reference to canonical texts. Ideas of constitutionalism and positivist motifs are apparent in this reformist effort, especially with Abdu.

Muhammad Rashid Rida (d. 1935) consti­tutes the culmination of Islamic modernism. A number of fundamental ideas were elaborately formulated during the course of his political, legal, and literary career, which started under Abdu. The caliphate in its classical mould is not possible in the present age, and the next best thing is a caliphal office of an apostolic and supervisory nature. The reform of shari'a along modernist lines and the introduction of extra-shari'a legislation is necessary; such matters are anyway well catered for in terms of the auxiliary, non-canonical provisions and legal methods known to classical Islamic jurisprudence. Of particular importance is Rida's conception of popular sovereignty, which is clothed in the Islamic conception of shura (consultation). Equally modernist are certain strands in Arab nationalist polities, and certain modem Islamic activists such as Mustafa Siba'i (d. 1956) hue formulated socialist principles of economic and social organization in Islamic language.

More prominent today than accomplished Islamic modernism is radical Islamism that refuses to countenance any compromise with the corrupt present. Hence the generic appel­lation salafiyya, the emulation of pious predecessors at the head of whom is Muham­mad. Salafi theory is mainly the work of Abul-A'la Mawdudi (d. 1979) and has had dramatic adepts in radical Egyptian Islamic groups, who are also under the influence of Sayyid Qutb (d. 1965). The main features of this line of thought are emphasis on the concept of hakimiyya (already encountered in Ibn Abd al-Wahhab), and the equally Wahhabi-inspired notion of hijra. This last term, used to designate the flight of Muhammad from Mecca to Medina in 622, indicates for its modem adepts the necessity of stepping apart from corrupt society in order to form a salafi alternative, which adheres to all examples set by pious predeces­sors. Outside the hijra, society is not only corrupt, but also impious, and the sole manner of dealing with it is by direct political and military action that seeks to bring about the foun­dation of a political system conforming to pious paradigms in every sense.

The idea of hakimiyya as pertaining to God only has been used by Shiite political theory as well. Unlike Shiite constitutionalism and modernist trends, the theory identified with Ruhollah Khomeini (1902- ) grounds in the exclusive sovereignty of God the corollary, unorthodox among Shiites though not without important precedent, that viceregency on earth resides in Shiite ecclesiastics (velayat-e faqih). This can be represented by one person -Khomeini himself at the time of writing - or a council of such ecclesiastics. The function of this office is to oversee the establishment of an order according to what one might term a Shiite salafiyya. Radical modern Shiite thought which has been influenced by modernist trends, such as that of Abol-Hasan Bani Sadr (b. 1933), sought to grapple with the despotic consequences of this notion, and developed a theory of generalized imamate, whereby every individ­ual is so formed by the Islamic state that he will be able to exercise the judgment and beha­viour one expects from a pious ecclesiastic. As in the case of Sunnism, primitivist utopia in Shiite fundamentalism is liable to inter­pretations both modernist and traditionalist.